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WAR TERMINATION AND THE JOINT FORCE COMMANDER

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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INTRODUCTION

Doctrine guides the joint force commander (JFC)¹ in planning and executing joint and combined campaigns and major operations. If doctrine is inadequate or misapplied, people may needlessly die, our nation's resources can be squandered, and wars lost. Thus, valid and complete doctrine helps the JFC master the art of war to effectively and efficiently achieve a war's political objectives. War termination is a critical aspect of strategy and the operational art of war. As such, the JFC must master the much neglected art of war termination to successfully function as the link between the strategic and operational levels of war.

Prior to the Gulf War, in the areas of military strategy and operational art, war termination was generally neglected. For example, in a 1986 Naval War College Review article titled, "War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace," Colonel Harry Summers stated, "war termination has been virtually ignored. In our fascination with the means of strategy, we have neglected the study of its ends—those objects which will lead directly to peace."² Additionally, Fred Ikle, in Every War Must End, echoed the problem when he said, "Most exertion is devoted to means—perfecting the military instruments and deciding on their use in battles and campaigns—and too little is left for relating these means to their ends."³ This fact was shamefully demonstrated during the Vietnam War where "almost 70 percent of the Army generals who managed the war were uncertain of its objectives."⁴

Since the Gulf War, much ink has been spilled recommending improvements to military doctrine and planning process in the area of war termination. This paper will review the key recommendations to revise our war termination doctrine. It will also analyze how the art of war termination was applied during the Gulf War, and determine the adequacy of our present war termination doctrine to guide today's JFC. Finally, based on the above analysis, this paper will

draw some conclusions and provide recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WAR TERMINATION DOCTRINE

Recommendations by war termination theorists to improve doctrine are usually grouped into three areas. The first group deals with the strategic-operational link—the political and military interface where national strategic objectives are translated into a military strategy as part of the operational design during campaign planning. The second group of recommendations concern guidance for the JFC regarding negotiations—the bridge between hostilities and peace. The final group of recommendations involves providing doctrine on planning for post-hostility operations—when military operations yield to other forms of national power to win a better peace by achieving the strategic goal or end state.

The Strategic-Operational Link

“The political object is the goal, war is a means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes.” Clausewitz⁵

Theorists contend war termination “epitomizes the relationship between political aims, military strategy, and operational design.”⁶ To achieve strategic success, the theorists use the “three pillars of strategy” as their construct: “ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources).”⁷ They emphasize a nation must begin war termination planning prior to hostilities—not taking the first step without considering the last.⁸ Thus, political leaders must clearly define the war’s purpose or political objectives (ends) before committing troops.

To help determine our objectives (ends), Colonel Clarke, of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, provides doctrine writers with a model to achieve what he terms “victory criteria.” This criteria is formed from three pieces of guidance: “a clear statement by political authorities of the desired situation in the post-hostility phase of the conflict (a vision of what the area should “look like” following hostilities); a clear set of political objectives that will,

when achieved, allow or cause the above vision to become reality; and a set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow or cause the above to happen.”⁹ This guidance is instrumental to developing a plan to achieve victory.

Victory is the goal because if deterrence fails and troops are committed to combat, the National Military Strategy requires the military to fight and win. Therefore, obtaining dominance in the concluding stages of a conflict by formulating coercive leverage is essential. This coercive leverage, a “result of strategic and operational design—political and military,” allows us to impose our will on an adversary to achieve our political aims (victory).¹⁰ Thus, victory is achieved through a political and military unity of effort (ways). This includes the unity of effort between the interagency, joint forces, and as a combined team (allies, coalition partners, and international organizations).¹¹

The JFC achieves victory by using force or the threat of force to accomplish the clearly defined political objectives.¹² To properly do this, the JFC uses the vision or end state, strategic objectives, and the National Military Strategy to create an operational design, linking the strategic and operational levels of war.¹³ In consonance with the end state, the strategic level provides the resources (means), concepts, and constraints for planning.

Armed with the strategic guidance, objectives, and a vision of the end state, the JFC determines how to create the coercive leverage in an operational design that will prompt the enemy to accept our political will, thereby terminating the war.¹⁴ War termination theorists rely on the classics such as Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to help the JFC in this effort.

Sun Tzu advises the commander to, “Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory will never be endangered.”¹⁵ Therefore, the JFC must determine the “nature” of the war and gain knowledge of the enemy. The JFC must assess the enemy’s “intent,” “objective,” definition of

“success,” “political and military strategy,” and most importantly the enemy’s “political and military centers of gravity.” The JFC must also determine the “decisive points,” and “what plans, operations and activities will most affect the enemy’s assessment of risk and cost.” Additionally, the JFC must determine “the implications for alliance or coalition warfare.”¹⁶ Finally, the JFC must assess friendly resources, vulnerabilities, weaknesses, limitations, and centers of gravity. Now, the JFC can develop an operational design to achieve victory.

To achieve victory, Clarke recommends employing military, economic, and political instruments of power to attack the enemy’s strategy, convincing them of their strategy’s futility and coercing them to change their political objectives.¹⁷ This matches Sun Tzu’s advice, “Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”¹⁸ To do this, Clarke recommends the JFC must successfully attack the opponent’s military and political center of gravity while defending his own.¹⁹

“In defining centers of gravity or establishing victory criteria,” Clarke tells the JFC to “look beyond the battlefield to the national politico-military objectives.”²⁰ In determining an enemy’s center of gravity, Clausewitz’s definition of center of gravity guides the JFC: “One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of power and movement, upon which everything depends. That point against which all our energies should be directed.”²¹ Thus, to achieve victory, the enemy must be coerced into changing his political objectives to accommodate ours. The JFC does this by translating the aims our political leaders want at the end of the conflict into military objectives; and then by planning backward and synchronizing his campaign, he can successfully attack the enemy’s center of gravity while protecting his own.²²

In sum, the JFC has a sophisticated and complex task. Using clearly defined political

guidance, objectives, and desired end state, the JFC is in the best position to create an operational design to achieve victory.²³ To do this, the JFC uses regressive planning—starting with the end state and planning backwards to determine the sequence of actions (ways) and required resources (means) to achieve the political or strategic vision (end).²⁴ To allow a swift and determined transition to war, peacetime is the optimal time for war termination planning.²⁵ However, prior to and during the war, one of the JFC's important functions is to assess the costs and risks associated with achieving the end state.

If the JFC is unable to create the coercive leverage to terminate the conflict on favorable terms, the conflict should not be entered or the end state must be modified. Thus, war termination considerations are a key element of operational design, flowing from a clearly defined end state and political aims prior to and during a war.²⁶ This iterative and highly interactive process links the operational and strategic levels of war.²⁷ Therefore, the JFC is “the indispensable link in providing political decision makers with crucial information on the enemy’s intent, objectives, overall strategy and chances for attaining his goals.”²⁸

Only when this strategic-operational link is successfully made do campaigns, major operations, engagements, and battles find their purpose in achieving the desired end. Thus, a battle only counts on the plus side if it fits into the larger design for ending the war on favorable terms; otherwise it could have disastrous consequences for its winner as did the victory the Japanese won at Pearl Harbor.²⁹

As noted earlier, planning is a highly interactive, and dynamic process due to changing circumstances that modify political and military objectives.³⁰ The Korean War illustrates how changing circumstances can shift objectives to produce undesirable results. According to Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, the UN’s first head of delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference:

[w]e learned in Korea that crystallization of political objectives should precede initiation of armistice talks ... United States force entered Korea... to prevent an impending collapse in the South Korean government and to repel aggression against South Korea. When the North Korean aggressor was thrown back... these two political objectives had been secured. Then the United States policy shifted to the intent to reunify Korea... [and then] became the desire to avoid an all-out war with China. When the Soviets suggested an armistice, the political objectives in Korea became an honorable cease-fire. During the armistice negotiations, we took on a political objective of gaining a propaganda victory over Communism in respect to prisoners of war. Thus, the political objectives of the United States in Korea weather-vaned with the winds of combat, accommodating themselves to military events rather than the goal to be reached through military operations.³¹

As seen here, Korea also shows how negotiations can bridge war and peace.

Negotiations—The Bridge Between Hostilities and Peace

“... war itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different.” Clausewitz³²

Negotiations are an important aspect of war termination. According to Paul Pillar, in Negotiating Peace, between 1800 and 1890, two-thirds of the interstate conflicts were terminated by negotiations, either before or after an armistice was reached.³³ Additionally, given the U.S. experience of negotiations in Korean and Vietnam wars, negotiations take on a critical light. The Korean negotiations drug on for two years during which 12,000 Americans were killed (35% of the US total) and 13,000 United Nations (UN) Command POWs were forced to endure extended captivity and mistreatment.³⁴ In Vietnam, the U.S. experienced five years of frustrating negotiations.³⁵ Consequently, the JFC must be aware of wartime negotiation pitfalls.

The JFC must understand negotiations can be a “continuation of war by other means.” According to Mao Tse-Tung, “Negotiation is undertaken for dual purpose of gaining time and to strengthen a position (military, political, social, economic) and to wear down and frustrate the opponent.”³⁶ This was evident in Vietnam and Korea. The North Vietnamese used negotiations effectively to prolong the conflict and erode U.S. public support (the U.S. center of gravity).³⁷ Korea demonstrated the effects of fighting while negotiating on troop morale. In his book, Korea, The War Before Vietnam, Callum A. MacDonald noted:

There was also the question of morale to consider. The troops were not fighting for victory but merely to influence negotiating positions at the talks. It was hard to ask men to die in a remote corner of North-East Asia when national survival was not at stake and equal sacrifices were not asked from other sections of the armed forces or the home front. They felt they were a forgotten army in an increasingly meaningless war.³⁸

The JFC must also consider the impact of an operational pause or a change in strategy on achieving political objectives through negotiations. Typically, pauses give an enemy a break to reinforce and prepare for the hostilities to resume.³⁹ This happened in Korea in 1951 after the UN offensive stopped at 38th parallel and the UN settled into an “active defense” strategy. The pause allowed an enemy build up, precluding any reasonable chance of the UN resuming a decisive ground offensive at a rational cost. Given war termination’s importance in the closing phases of a war, theorists offer suggestions to enhance our joint doctrine.

Some theorists view war termination as such an important aspect of war, they recommend it become a separate phase in campaign planning.⁴⁰ They see wartime negotiations as an instrument of war whose aim must be to achieve the war’s policy objectives.⁴¹ Thus, negotiations should naturally and effectively complement combat in pursuing a war’s political objectives.⁴² They view combat itself as a form of bargaining. “Even in unconditional surrenders, a bargain is being made: the losers will lay down their arms and the victors will not massacre them.”⁴³

To obtain the political objective, they say the enemy must be shown that continued fighting will be worse than accepting your current offer.⁴⁴ Thus, successful wartime negotiations continually places the enemy at risk of military defeat to ensure his most acceptable course of action is to agree to your present offer. Hence, during negotiations one must not demand something that is reasonably beyond one’s ability to gain by force. Consequently, one must never rule out using decisive military force as a means to achieve policy goals.⁴⁵

At the operational level, the military seeks to “increase the leverage available to national decision makers during terminal phases of a war” by “manipulating” the cost-versus-benefit equation to guide the enemy’s strategic decisions.⁴⁶ For example, the sweeping operational maneuver during Desert Storm that threatened Baghdad added incentive for a cease-fire. This operational decision affected the enemy’s “strategic calculus” by increasing allied negotiating leverage.⁴⁷ During the Korean war, the operational commander did not create sufficient leverage to raise the cost/benefit calculus for the Chinese to produce an acceptable truce.⁴⁸ In fact, the enemy’s incentive was reduced early in the negotiations (July 1951) when it was agreed the cease-fire line would follow line a little north of 38th parallel. This decreased North Korea’s risk of a worse outcome as the price for refusing to accept UN offers over the next two years.⁴⁹

The following highlights recommendations for joint doctrine concerning negotiations:

- Identify war termination as a distinct phase in campaign planning.⁵⁰
- Negotiate while preparing to “use decisive military force in an effort to make resistance militarily impossible if the proffered settlement is rejected.”⁵¹
- Seize territory or other high-value objectives to enhance the government’s ability to secure a favorable outcome.⁵²
- Increase operations tempo to exploit a gain and build leverage.⁵³
- Maintain communications with the enemy while fighting.⁵⁴
- Use “pauses, thresholds, or “break-points” in fighting as opportunities for intensified bargaining.”⁵⁵
- Keep “forces in reserve as a further deterrent or as added bargaining leverage.”⁵⁶
- Show “good faith, even through unilateral gestures, as part of the explicit or implicit bargaining that leads to conflict termination.”⁵⁷

In future limited regional conflicts, war termination will be heavily influenced by the “political leverage” produced through “battlefield success.”⁵⁸ Therefore, Sun Tzu’s advice will

prove useful, "Seize something the enemy cherishes and he will conform to your desires."⁵⁹ Thus, the JFC, in concert with civilian decision makers, could develop plans where "operational objectives" exceed the minimum "political objectives" to "gain leverage" for a speedy "termination of hostilities and the effective transition to the post-hostilities phase."⁶⁰

Post-Hostility Operations

Post-hostility operations are designed to "win the peace." According to theorists, these operations are "perhaps the critical phase of the military campaign."⁶¹ End states are realized during this phase of operations. Therefore, this phase, like the other aspects of war termination, relies on "political-military strategic objectives in terms of clearly defined end states."⁶² Achieving these objectives depends on in-depth analysis, and highly coordinated and detailed campaign planning between policy makers, the military, government agencies, and allies or coalition members prior to hostilities.⁶³ This coordination is essential because as post-hostility civilian-military operations (CMO) proceed, the military will yield "control and influence" progressively toward "civilian dominance."⁶⁴ Thus, without clearly defined end states, detailed and properly coordinated planning, and a well organized post-hostility effort, strategic objectives cannot be achieved or at a minimum be severely hampered.

In Panama, the above lessons were learned the hard way. During Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, the post-hostilities CMO conducted with Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, achieving the political aim was "strategically ambiguous" because the end state of restoring democracy was never defined as an objective.⁶⁵ This violated the need to develop a campaign plan with clearly defined strategic goals in terms of an end state. Furthermore, the post-hostility planning that was conducted lacked unity of effort in the interagency environment because it was not coordinated outside the defense department. Finally, the organizations orchestrating the

CMO activities in Panama, were not “fully effective” because they were “wholly military.” Instead, an “interagency organization” working for the Ambassador and staffed with many military members is required to properly orchestrate CMO activities.⁶⁶ Theorists recommend including these lessons learned in joint doctrine.

Using the above doctrinal recommendations, this paper will now analyze Desert Storm.

WAR TERMINATION IN DESERT STORM

The Strategic-Operational Link

Strategic Objectives. On 8 August 1990, six days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the President clearly articulated the following U.S. strategic objectives that remained constant throughout the war: “Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoration of the Kuwait’s legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.”⁶⁷ Throughout the war, the President brilliantly performed many strategic functions.

Strategic Plan For Victory. President Bush provided the JFC valuable domestic and international support by isolating Iraq, and forging a strong and legitimate political, economic, and military grand strategy. He created unity of effort by obtaining UN resolutions “condemning Iraqi aggression,” and allowing “all means necessary” to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Also, he imposed economic sanctions against Iraq and formed and led a 31 nation military coalition.

Strategic-Operational Relationship. Unity of command was evident in the close relationships, frequent communication and coordination, and simple chain of command from the strong Commander-in-Chief (President Bush) to the SECDEF (Mr. Cheney) through the CJCS (General Powell) to the JFC (General Schwarzkopf). The President, who according to the

SECDEF, was from the “Don’t screw around” school of military strategy,” imposed few constraints and supplied the resources requested by the CJCS and JFC.⁶⁸

Operational Design. Equipped with strategic guidance (ends) and ample resources (means) the JFC performed assessments and created an operational design to formulate an offensive campaign plan. The JFC identified three Iraqi centers of gravity: Iraqi command, control, and leadership of Saddam Hussein; Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and the Republican Guard in the Kuwait Theater of Operation (KTO).⁶⁹ Additionally, the JFC defined his objectives as “end states” in “two policy goals,” “restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait and regional stability.”⁷⁰ The JFC also formulated theater military objectives whose attainment would “allow or cause” the policy goals to happen. The military objectives were to: “attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command, control; gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy known nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) production, storage, and delivery capabilities; destroy Republican Guard forces in the KTO; and liberate Kuwait City.”⁷¹

The Campaign Plan. To achieve their goals and objectives, the military and political leaders regressively planned a four phased sequential campaign plan—three air and one ground phase (ways). The plan protected coalition centers of gravity while ejecting Iraq’s forces from Kuwait and destroying Iraq’s ability to further threaten regional peace and stability. “Carefully selected targets” would be attacked, leaving most basic Iraqi economic targets intact to “weaken Saddam Hussein’s regime” and “create a stable regional military balance.”⁷² The plan relied on “overwhelming combat power,” “deception,” and synchronized “rapid maneuver” for success.⁷³

Plan Execution. On 24 February 1991, after over six months of “maritime interception operations and 38 days of aerial bombardment,” the ground phase began. The JFC’s intent for the

estimated two week ground offensive was to: “Maximize friendly strength against Iraqi weaknesses and terminate offensive operations with the Republican Guard destroyed and major U.S. forces controlling critical lines of communication in the KTO.” Victory would be achieved by destroying the Republican Guard in the KTO, preserving the combined force’s offensive capability, and restoring Kuwait’s sovereignty.⁷⁴ On 28 February 1991, after a 100 hour ground phase, the President terminated the war and declared victory.

The End-State. Strategic victory in Desert Storm is debatable because the end state or “a vision of what the area should “look like” following hostilities” was “fuzzy.”⁷⁵ The President, military, and others had differing visions for security and stability in the Gulf. As a result, no common well-defined end state existed. Thus, some say victory in the Gulf war was uncertain.⁷⁶

The President’s End State. Based on the President’s covert actions, public rhetoric, and post-war comments, one can argue his end state included the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government.⁷⁷ Thus, a clear strategic victory required a collapse as a precondition to achieve security and stability in the Gulf. However, the military did not share the President’s perspective.

The Military’s End State. The military believed regional stability required a “weakened” not “dismembered” Iraq.⁷⁹ According to General Powell in My American Journey, “In none of the meetings I attended was dismembering Iraq, conquering Baghdad, or changing the Iraqi form of government ever seriously considered.” For regional stability, Iraq was needed as a “counterweight to Iran.” Plus, the Saudis did not want a Shiite regime on their border, nor did Turkey want a Kurdish regime on their border. In the end, “an Iraq still standing, with Saddam overthrown” was desired, but “his elimination was not a stated objective.”⁸⁰

The War Termination Decision. In deciding to terminate the war, the president was influenced by military assessments, the political situation, and public perceptions.

Military Assessments. On 27 February 1991, at 1300 EST, the JFC described the campaign strategy and assessed the operations to date in the televised "Mother of All Briefings:"

We've accomplished our mission, and when the decision-makers come to a decision that there should be a cease-fire, nobody will be happier than me. ... We've almost completely destroyed the offensive capability of the Iraqi forces in the KTO. ... The gates are closed. ... don't want to give you the impression that absolutely nothing is escaping. Heavy tanks and artillery were not getting through. I'm talking about the gate is closed on the war machine.⁸¹

He also said, Iraq was no longer an offensive regional threat. Although earlier that day, he told the CJCS he needed another day of combat, the JFC just "all but declared victory" to the world.⁸²

The Political Situation. Politically the President was in a box. Iraq agreed to comply with the UN resolutions and had ordered their troops to leave Kuwait. Also, the UN and coalition agreed on "driving the Iraqis from Kuwait, not taking the war into Iraq or on destroying the Iraqi forces."⁸³ The President had to choose between losing the moral high ground or ending the war.

Public Perceptions. Given the military's televised assessment, the UN and coalition mandate, and the reports on the "Highway of Death," the media began asking, why are we continuing to fight?⁸⁴ The President feared if the fighting continued for another day, Washington could be "accused of a slaughter of Iraqis who were simply trying to escape, not fight."⁸⁵

The Decision. At 1430 on 27 February 1991, the President met with his advisors to discuss the war. The above was discussed and the CJCS briefed, "We don't want to be seen as killing for the sake of killing, Mr. President. We're within the window of success. I've talked to General Schwartzkopf. I expect by sometime tomorrow the job will be done, and I'll probably be bringing you a recommendation to stop the fighting." The President said, "If that's the case, why not end it today?" Surprised, the CJCS consulted with the JFC who concurred. Based on the military's advice and the situation, President rationally terminated the war effective 2400 EST.⁸⁶ To encourage Saddam Hussein's overthrow, a heightened political rhetoric campaign began.

The “Fog of War” and Assessments. When asked, “why not end the war,” the JFC must assess the cost or risk of stopping. In this case, the JFC wanted a quick cease-fire because the mission was accomplished—Iraq was ejected and no longer a regional threat. Casualties were also a concern.⁸⁷ Furthermore, the forces had been on the move for four days and lead elements were reaching their culminating point, requiring an operational pause to rest, refuel, and rearm. Finally, continuing the war to destroy more Iraqi capability required assaulting Basra. The Iraqis were digging in around the marshy city and the cost of extracting them would exceed any marginal gain to the war effort.⁸⁸ Thus, at that time it made sense to terminate the war.

As the fog of war lifted it was clear the door was open and Iraqi armor was streaming out. About half the Republican Guard escaped destruction, reducing Saddam’s vulnerability to a successful coup. This was due, in part, to the JFC’s lack of synchronization between the Army and Marine attacks. The Marines pushed the Iraqis out of Kuwait rather than “fixing” them so the Army could encircle and destroy them.⁸⁹ The JFC relayed the status to the CJCS, but once made, a decision is difficult to reverse. Consequently, for good war termination assessments, the JFC requires accurate and timely intelligence, especially during fast moving operations.

The Gulf War Post-Conflict Negotiations

Coalition Leverage. Battlefield success, the massive array of combat power, and territorial occupation gave the JFC immense coercive leverage to secure political aims at the cease-fire negotiations. The coalition could extract all their demands by force. Thus, with the alternative of further military defeat, the Iraqis were very conciliatory. Some leverage, however, was previously lost during the “Mother of All Briefings,” when the JFC eroded the administration’s hopes for a coup by telling the Iraqis the allies had no intention of going to Baghdad.⁹⁰ Sadly, the JFC had no political instructions for the negotiations, only “terms of

reference" for "discussions."⁹¹ Nor did any senior administration official accompany the JFC during the negotiations. The politicians erroneously saw the event as a "military decision."⁹²

Negotiations. During the negotiations, the Iraqis quickly agreed to all allied demands—POW exchanges, locations of mine fields, no SCUD missile launches, weapons of mass destruction sites, a temporary cease-fire line, and allied "defensive" flights over Iraq. Then, the JFC asked the Iraqis if they had any matters to discuss.⁹³

Helicopter Flights. The Iraqis requested helicopter flights in Iraq. When the JFC agreed, as long as they did not fly over areas with allied troops, the Iraqis asked, "military helicopters"..."armed helicopters?" The JFC consented and added, "If they must fly over the area we are located in, I prefer that they not be gunships, armed helos, and I would prefer that they have an orange tag on the side as an extra safety measure." The Iraqis were amazed.⁹⁴ But, the JFC's logic for this ill conceived concession was even more amazing. He stated, "It appeared to me to be a legitimate request. And given that the Iraqis had agreed to all our requests, I didn't feel it was unreasonable to grant one of theirs."⁹⁵ Concerned about allied troops, not Iraqi internal oppression or Saddam's collapse, the JFC gave Saddam Hussein more power to suppress a coup.

"Guaranteed" Withdrawal. The JFC also "guaranteed" the allies would withdraw from Iraq as rapidly as they could. This concession ceded considerable leverage to the Iraqis. Iraqi territory would have been a great bargaining chip for future political demands, such as Saddam's removal or protection for the Shiites and Kurds. But, the advantage was lost. Many in Washington were dismayed with JFC's negotiations performance.⁹⁶

Post-Hostility Operations

Desert Storm posed some particularly challenging issues for post-hostility operations planning and execution. John Fishel's Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination

and Desert Storm, provides the JFC and planners useful lessons learned.

The first lesson learned was the post-hostility phase of the military operations must be part of the campaign plan in full coordination with warfighting prior to hostilities.⁹⁷ According to the JFC, in Desert Storm, the rapid success of the ground operations and the unexpected consequences caught the CENTCOM unprepared for follow-on actions.⁹⁸

The second lesson learned, as seen above, was that strategic victory is hard to achieve when there is a disconnect between the military vision of the end state and the political vision, resulting from the lack of a commonly accepted well-defined end state.⁹⁹ Two political-military objectives fell in this category. First, the shared objective was to restore Kuwait's government, however, contained within this objective was the goal to move it toward a "more democratic mode," but this was not defined in the military's end state. The second lack of a well-defined end state was between the military's vision and strategy for security and stability in the Gulf (degraded Iraq) and the U.S. Government policy (overthrow of Saddam Hussein), as discussed earlier. The lack of a common vision prevented unity of effort and hampered CMO.¹⁰⁰

The third lesson learned stemmed from the military's failure to realize the impact of Presidential "rhetorical policy" statements on their CMO planning. For example, Presidential statements prompted the revolts of the Shiites and the Kurds which required "civilian-military, displaced civilian/refugee relief operations." These efforts were unforeseen, and thus, unplanned.¹⁰¹

Finally, to successfully terminate a war with appropriate post-hostility operations, the above lessons must be applied to achieve "unity of effort" "within the entire U.S. Government." This requires "interagency coordination" and planning at all levels.¹⁰²

DOCTRINE REVIEW

Given doctrinal recommendations and the experience of Desert Storm, now we will see if today's doctrine is adequate for the JFC's planning responsibilities. The 1 February 1995, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, and the June 1993, Army FM 100-5, Operations, provide the JFC extensive direction and guidance for planning and conducting joint operations. The writing of the theorists and Desert Storm lessons learned have been incorporated. These documents weave war termination theory, including the strategic-operational aspects of end states, operational design, negotiations, and post-hostility operations, throughout to provide adequate and appropriate doctrine for planning. Also, the 10 January 1995, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, highlights the fundamentals in joint warfare and the joint campaign. Furthermore, the 11 September 1994, "User's Guide for Joint Operation Planning," overviews deliberate, crisis action, and campaign planning. It also includes post-hostilities and redeployment as a separate and final phase of campaign planning.

These documents correctly do not create a separate termination phase. War termination is a process, not a phase. It starts at the beginning and works all the way through a plan to the end. War termination does "epitomize the relationship between political aims, military strategy, and operational design;" and as a continuous, dynamic, and interactive process, it never ends.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A well defined end state is essential to success. Desert Storm graphically illustrates the importance of a clear, unambiguous end state. The President had one end state in mind and the military another. During the ground war, the loss of synchronization at the operational level contributed to the Republican Guard's escape. This gave Saddam Hussein the forces to put down the Shiite and Kurd rebellion the President was fostering through his public rhetoric campaign.

The JFC was unprepared to handle these post-hostility operations because although the political and military objectives matched, the end states did not. Further, during the "Mother of All Briefings," the JFC reduced the President's leverage on creating the conditions for a coup by telling the world the allies had no intention of attacking Baghdad. Also, during the cease-fire negotiations the JFC allowed armed helicopter flights and "guaranteed" the rapid withdrawal of coalition forces from southern Iraq. These actions gave Saddam Hussein power to crush the uprisings and reduced U.S. leverage by ceding the territory without concession. Again, this undermined the President's ability to achieve his end state. In total, the failure to synchronize the political and military end states weakened the overall unity of effort; the strategic-operational link, negotiations, and post-hostility operations. Regrettably, the lack of a well-defined end state produced a situation where strategic victory in the Gulf War is in the eye of the beholder. Clearly, there is a compelling need for the JFC to get a precisely defined end state from the NCA so unity of effort in plans and operations at the operational and strategic level are achieved to produce victory.

War termination is a critical aspect of strategy and the operational art of war. Doctrine is authoritative guidance for the JFC and planners to plan, conduct, and end wars. Valid and complete doctrine is essential for success in achieving a war's political purpose and helping the JFC master the art of war. Although it should not become dogma, doctrine contains lessons bought by the blood of those who came before, and our ignorance or misuse of doctrine or failure to improve it may cost needless casualties and possibly defeat. Thus, I recommend we continue studying and improving joint doctrine to remain ready for the next war—lives depend on it.

NOTES

¹ As defined by Joint Pub 3-0, 1 February 1995, this denotes “a general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational command over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02). For the purposes of this paper, this term is used to denote the combatant commander in charge of joint planning.

² Harry G. Summers, quoted in Robert R. Soucy II, Kevin A Shwedo, and John S. Haven II, “War Termination and Joint Planning,” Joint Force Quarterly, (Summer 1995), 95. Original quote from Harry G. Summers, Jr., “War: Deter, Fight, Terminate; The Purpose of War is a Better Peace,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (January-February 1986), 19.

³ Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End, (New York: Columbia University Press, Revised Edition, 1991), 1.

⁴ Harry G. Summers, Jr., “Full Circle - World War II to the Persian Gulf,” Military Review, Vol. LXXII, No. 2 (February 1992), 40.

⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87

⁶ Michael R. Rampy, “The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities,” Military Review, Vol. LXXII (October 1992), 42.

⁷ John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 2.

⁸ Clausewitz, 579.

⁹ Bruce B.G. Clarke, “Conflict Termination: What Does It Mean to Win?” Military Review, Vol. LXXII, No. 11, (November 1992), 85.

¹⁰ Rampy, 43.

¹¹ Fishel, 4-6.

¹² Rampy, 43.

¹³ Ibid., 50.

¹⁴ Ibid., 52.

¹⁵ Sun Tzu. The Art Of War, (Translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith), (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1963), 129.

¹⁶ Rampy, p. 52, and Clarke, 85.

¹⁷ Clarke, 85.

¹⁸ Sun Tzu, 77.

¹⁹ Clarke 85.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Carl von Clausewitz quoted in Clarke, 85. Original quote from Clausewitz, 596.

²² Clarke, 86 and 85.

²³ Rampy, 52.

²⁴ Clarke, 85.

²⁵ Rampy, 52.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 50.

²⁸ Ibid., 53.

²⁹ Ikle, 19.

³⁰ James W. Reed, "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning," Parameters, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (Summer 1993), 45.

³¹ James D. D. Smith, Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-fire, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), 125.

³² Clausewitz, 605.

³³ Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 25.

³⁴ Benard Brodie, War and Politics, (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 95, and William Roskey, "Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse," Parameters, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (Summer 1993), 96.

³⁵ Harry G. Summers, Jr., "Full Circle - World War II to the Persian Gulf," Military Review, (February 1992), 42.

³⁶ Mao Tse-Tung, quoted in Roy R. Pinette, "Operational Considerations For War Termination," Naval War College, (Unpublished Paper, 17 June 1994), 14. Original quote from Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, (Translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith III), (Baltimore, MD: N & A Publishing Co. of America, 1992), 49.

³⁷ Pinette, 14.

³⁸ Callum A. MacDonald quoted in Roy R. Pinette, "Operational Considerations For War Termination," Naval War College, (Unpublished Paper, 17 June 1994), 14-15. Quote as seen here from Callum A. MacDonald, Korea The War Before Vietnam, (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 220.

³⁹ Joseph McMillian, "Talking to the Enemy: Negotiations in Wartime," Written 27 April 1992, Joint Electronic Library, Vol. 3, No. 1 (May 1995), 17.

⁴⁰ Reed, 49 and Clarke, 86.

⁴¹ McMillian, 10 and 2.

⁴² Ibid., 27.

⁴³ Ibid., 2.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 14.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 17-18.

⁴⁶ Reed, 45-46.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 46.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 48.

⁴⁹ McMillian, 17-18.

⁵⁰ Reed, 49 and Clarke, 86.

⁵¹ McMillian, 14.

⁵² Reed, 50.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 43.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 49.

⁵⁹ Sun Tzu, 139.

⁶⁰ Reed, 49.

⁶¹ John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing The Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), v.

⁶² Ibid., viii.

⁶³ Rampy, 53.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 54.

⁶⁵ Fishel, vii.

⁶⁶ Ibid., viii-ix.

⁶⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office., 1992. Reprint edition. Newport RI: Naval War College, 1992), 38.

⁶⁸ Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), 195 and 243-45.

⁶⁹ U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress, 94.

⁷⁰ John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 60.

⁷¹ U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress, 96-97.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 98.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 100.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 311 and 317.

⁷⁵ John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 60.

⁷⁶ U.S. News & World Report Staff, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War, (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1992)

⁷⁷ According to Bob Woodward's book, The Commanders, the President sought Saddam Hussein's overthrow soon after the war began. In August 1990, "Bush signed a top-secret intelligence "finding," authorizing CIA covert actions to overthrow Saddam. The CIA was not to violate the ban on involvement in assassination attempts, but rather recruit Iraqi dissidents to remove Saddam from power." 282. The President also made numerous calls in public statements for "the overthrow of Saddam Hussein." John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 60. Finally, in post-war comments the President contends we stopped the war too soon, referring to Saddam Hussein remaining in power.

⁷⁹ John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 60.

⁸⁰ General Colin L. Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, (New York: Random House, 1995), 490.

⁸¹ Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, (New York: Dell Publishing, 1992), 268-294.

⁸² Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War, The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf, (Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1995), 418.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 415-16.

⁸⁴ Powell, 520.

⁸⁵ Gordon, 416.

⁸⁶ Powell, 521-23.

⁸⁷ General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 469.

⁸⁸ Colonel John S. Brown, USA, "The Hundred Hour End Point, an Operational Assessment," (Naval War College, Unpublished Paper, 19 June 1992), 1-34.

⁸⁹ Gordon, 417.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 418.

⁹¹ Schwarzkopf, 480.

⁹² Gordon, 444.

⁹³ Ibid., 444-446.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 446.

⁹⁵ Schwarzkopf, 489.

⁹⁶ Gordon, 447-448.

⁹⁷ John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 69.

⁹⁸ Gordon, 515.

⁹⁹ Fishel, 69.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 60-62.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 60 and xi.

¹⁰² Ibid., 69.

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